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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
SUZANNE LEE and NATHAN LEE
GARZA, through his
guardian, SUZANNE LEE,
PlaintiffAppellant,

MEMORANDUM OF NEWLY
UNCOVERED AUTHORITY

>

vs.
Case Nos. 20995 and 21063
DR. LYNN GAUFIN,
Category No. 13.b.
DefendantRespondent.

;

The plaintiff-appellant cites as newly uncovered
authority the case of Strahler v. St. Luke T s Hospital, 706
S.W.2d 7

(Mo. banc

1986).

Strahler, a nineteen-year

old

plaintiff, alleged that she had received negligent medical
treatment four years prior to filing the suit.

][d. at 8.

Missouri law barred action against any health care provider
unless brought within two years of the date of occurrence.
The

statute protected

tenth

birthday

when

the
the

claims

statute

of

infants

began

to

until

run.

their

_Id.

In

Missouri, minors lack capacity to institute, civil lawsuits
in their own right.

Id. at 9.

The Missouri Constitution

provides that "the courts of justice shall be open to every
person,

and

person. . ."

certain

remedy

afforded

for every

injury

to

Mo. Const., art. I, §14.

The Court found that minors have a constitutionally protected

right of access

to the Court

even

though

their parents or guardians may fail to protect the child! s
interests.

I^d. at 11.

This is the argument made by Appel-

lant at Point I of his Brief and Point I of his Reply Brief.
The Court states that "the method employed by the
[Missouri] legislature to battle any escalating economic and
social costs connected with medical malpractice

litigation

exacts far too high a price from minor plaintiffs like Carol
Strahler and all other minors similarly situated."

I_d.

The

appellant argues identically at Point II of his Brief and
Points II and III of his Reply Brief.
DATED this 11

day of

//u*

r 1986.

ROBERTAJ. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

As

applied

to

minors,

does

Utah

Code

Annotated, §78-14-4, (1953 as amended) violate the Open
Courts provision contained in Article I, Section 11, of the
Utah Constitution.
2.

As

applied

to

minors,

does

Utah

Code

Annotated, §78-14-4, (1953 as amended) violate the equal
protection guarantee contained in Article I, Section 24 of
the Utah Constitution.
3.

Does Utah Code Annotated, §78-14-4, (1953 as

amended) violate either the due process clause of the Utah
Constitution or the equal protection clause of Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Through his guardian, plaintiff-appellant, Nathan
Lee

Garza,

seeks

review

of

a

ruling

by

Judge

Cullen

Christensen of the Fourth Judicial District Court granting
defendant's Motion to Dismiss his claims.

The trial court

ruled that Nathanfs suit was not timely filed under the
provisions
amended).

of

Utah

Code

Annotated,

§78-14-4

(1953, as

FACTS

Nathan Lee Garza was not even a year old when his
mother first took him to Dr. Lynn Gaufin, a neurologist (R.
29). Dr. Gaufin saw Nathan on August 13, 1980, August 29,
1980, and October 24, 1980, for shaking spells (R. 13). Dr.
Gaufin diagnosed Nathan's condition as encephalomyelitis
(R. 29) .
About nine months after his first visit to Dr.
Gaufin,

another

physician

told

plaintiff's

mother

Nathan had hydrocephalus, not encephalomyelitis

that

(R. 30) .

Hydrocephalus, or water on the brain, is treatable if caught
in time (R. 87).
But

by

the

time

plaintiff's

condition

was

correctly diagnosed and treated, pressure from the hydrocephalus

had

already

caused

brain

damage

(R.

30, 87).

Because Dr. Gaufin failed to properly diagnose and treat
plaintiff, Nathan is now retarded and will be handicapped
for life (R. 31, 87). He is now six years old (R. 30).
Nathan's father left the family when he realized
the extent of Nathan's handicap (R. 30). Nathan's mother,
Suzanne Lee, had to work to provide for her family.

She

bore the burden of caring for Nathan and his younger brother
alone.
Mrs. Lee began the malpractice process by filing a
Notice of Claim on May 6, 1983

(R. 12, 30).

discovery rule, this filing may have been timely.

Under the
But,

because

of

all

the

pressure

she

was

under, Mrs. Lee

instructed her attorneys to discontinue the litigation (R.
30, 33). They complied.

New attorneys served a new notice

on November 9, 1984 (R. 12). This action was filed on March
8, 1985 (R. 4).
Defendant moved to dismiss Nathan's claims based
upon the two-year statute of limitations and four-year statute of repose set forth in Section 78-14-4 of the Utah Code
Annotated.

The trial court granted the motion (R. 71-74).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Medical Malpractice Act's short 2-year Statute
of Limitations is not tolled during minority.
statutes of limitations are tolled for minors.

All other
The Medical

Malpractice Act's short four-year statute of repose is not
tolled

for

minority

either.

Consequently,

the

Medical

Malpractice Act takes away the rights of those minors whose
guardians do not act quickly for them to recovery for their
injuries.
The Open Court's provision in our State's Constitution seeks to preserve the basic notion that one who
inflicts injury ought to be responsible for the damage he
causes.

Under that provision, common law rights cannot be

totally taken away without providing

a substitute unless

there is a showing of real need and a showing that the means
used to meet that need is reasonable and appropriate.
not necessary

It is

to preserve medical care to take away the

right of a minor to recover for medical malpractice.

In

addition, the multitude of special legislation which exists
to deal with the alleged medical malpractice crisis proves
that less drastic steps can be taken.
Minors in medical malpractice cases are treated
differently than all other injured minors.

This discrimi-

nation violates the equal protection provisions of Utah's
Constitution.

Any positive benefit which such discrimination

would have to the medical profession as a whole is so tenuous

that

this

particular

form

of

discrimination

cannot

withstand even the most minimum equal protection standard.
The legislation certainly could not withstand the higher
scrutiny given the rights which have some Constitutional
status.

Under

our

State's

Constitutionf

the

right

to

recover for one's injuries is such a right.
Minors are also treated differently than adults in
the medical malpractice context.
period.

Adults have a discovery

Unless someone takes action for them, young minors

do not have a real discovery period.

ARGUMENT

I
AS APPLIED TO MINORS,
SECTION 78-14-4 VIOLATES THE OPEN
COURTS-INJURY REDRESS PROVISION OF UTAH'S CONSTITUTION
Berry v. Beach Aircraft Corp. , 25 Utah Adv. Rep.
30 held that Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution
places meaningful restrictions on the legislature's power.
Specifically, Berry held that legislation which abrogates a
common law right without creating an adequate substitute is
unconstitutional unless "there is a clear social or economic
evil to be eliminated

and the elimination of a remedy is

not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the
objection."

Id at 36.

Given the court's holding in Berry v. Beach Aircraft,
supra and the court's comment in MaIan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661,
671 (Utah 1984) on the propriety of premium reduction as a
justification for disparate treatment of classes, legislation
abrogating the right to bring an action to reduce premiums
would not be valid, at least absent a finding that insurance is
not available at prices which make an affected business sector
viable. Even thenf the means chosen needs to be examined for
reasonableness and the lack of less drastic alternatives.
Justice has its cost. The notion of fundamental justice is
interwoven into the fabric of our society and our State
Constitution. Before cutting premiums can become a legitimate
reason for eliminating the right to maintain an action for
one's injuries, something significantly more than a mere desire
to reduce premiums must be shown.
Because the issues in this case can be resolved on
other grounds, there is probably no need to reach the issue.
But it is not without significance that Arneson v. Olsen, 270
N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978) and Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I.
1983) found that no medical malpractice insurance crisis
existed during the relevant time period.

At least as applied to minors, the non-tolling
requirement and statute of repose in Section 78-14-4 violate
Article I, Section 11 of Utah's Constitution.
the Utah

Rules

of Civil

Procedure

filing suit on their own behalf.

Rule 17 of

prevents

minors

from

Of course, young children

are inherently unable to comprehend their legal rights.

By

imposing additional restrictions on top of a minor's mental
and

legal

disabilities,

Utah's

Medical

Malpractice

Act

effectively abrogates the common law right a minor has to
recover for personal injuries unless that minor is fortunate
enough to have a guardian who effectively pursues the claim
for him.

Section 78-14-4 thereby closes the courthouse door

to the very people that need the law's protection the most.
As

applied

to

minors,

neither

the

Medical

Malpractice Act's anti-tolling provision nor the four year
statute of repose satisfy the test which Berry v. Beach
Aircraft

set

for

person's common

statutes

law right.

which

effectively

abrogate

a

Studies show that less that

one-seventh (1/7) of all medical malpractice claims involve
minors.

Jenkins, California's Medical Injury Compensation

Reform Act on Equal Protection Challenge, 52 So. Cal. L.Rev.
829, 960-961

(1979).

Those same studies show that 90% of

all medical malpractice claims are discovered within four
years.
minors

(Ld.)
will

Courts have recognized that most claims of
be

brought

quickly.

Barrio

v.

San

Manuel

Division Hospital for Magna Copper Company, 692 Pe2d 280,
286

(Ariz.

1984).

Obviously,

any

effect

that

the

"long-tail" claims of minors have on the medical profession

would be de minimus.

There certainly has been no showing

that a minor's long-tail claims have a meaningful effect on
the medical industry as a whole in Utah.
As recent history has shown, there is no shortage
3
of alternative ways to deal with the alleged crisis.
Other

alleged

reasons

for

this

devastating

treatment of minors have been advanced by an articulate
industry.

But the test set forth in Berry v. Beach Aircraft

is a strict weighing test.

Reasons need to be examined for

merit and weighed against fundamental justice.
For example, defendant has argued that the statute
of repose is needed to prevent fraud and situations where
critical evidence may have been lost over time.

But that

does not significantly distinguish medical malpractice claims

To the extent that there is any increase in premiums at
allf that increase will likely be offset, at least in
catastrophic cases, by increases in welfare. The net effect to
the tax-paying, bill paying public will be even more de minimus
than any conjectural effect on premiums.
3These include the abolition of the collateral source rule
(Section 78-14-4.5, Utah Code Annotated, adopted in 1985), and
the prelitigation review panel (Section 78-14-12, adopted in
1985) , as well as the recent more controversial enactments.
Not only do these changes show that there are alternatives to
eliminating claims altogether, they also show that the legal
climate has changed since Section 78-14-4 was enacted. Such
changes may be considered in considering the constitutionality
of older legislation. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah
1984); Stone v. Department of Registration, 567 P.2d 1115, 1117
(1977) .

from all other types of claims.
burden

to prove

the

facts.

Moreover, it is plaintiff's
The

lost records

and

faded

memories are as important to the victim as they are to the
doctor.

Significantly, this court has consistently ruled

that the stale claims considerations are outweighed by the
unfair effect which the total elimination of rights can have
on a minor.

Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980);

Szaval v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d

1082

(Utah 1981);

see also

Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981).

II
AUTHORITIES DIRECTLY ON POINT HOLD SIMILAR
STATUTES TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER OPEN COURT PROVISIONS
Sax

v.

Votteler,

648

S.W.2d

661

(Tex.

1983)

applied the same test set forth in Berry v. Beach Aircraft,
supra to invalidate a similar anti-tolling provision in that
state's medical malpractice legislation.

Under Texas1 Open

Court's Provision, the Court declared that the anti-tolling
provision was unreasonable and that the child's right to
justice outweighed the legislation's purposes.
the

argument

that

parents

will

adequately

Addressing
protect

child's right, the court stated:
This Court, however, cannot assume that
parents will act in such a manner. It
is neither reasonable nor realistic to
rely on parents, who may themselves be
minors,
or
who
may
be
ignorant,
lethargic, or lack concern, to bring a
malpractice
suit
within
the
time
provided.
(648 S.W.2d 661 at 667) .

the

The facts of this case illustrate how apt such
reasoning is.

Nathan's father left when he understood the

extent of his handicap (R. 30). His mother, who had to bear
the burden of caring for the family alone, could not stand
the pressure and instructed attorneys to drop the case.
(R. 30, 33).
The Arizona Supreme Court agreed that a guardian's
ability to bring a child's claim for him is not an adequate
safeguard.

Invalidating

the

part

of

Arizona's

medical

malpractice act which required minors injured before age
seven to bring

their

action before

they were

Arizona Supreme Court stated:
We are well aware that where a chance of
substantial recovery exists, there is no
lack of advocates willing to undertake
appropriate procedures to find and
appoint a guardian ad litem or to obtain
a "next friend" so that the action may
be brought. While the vast majority of
claims on behalf of injured minors will
still be brought within a relevantly
short time after the injury occurs, this
all depends upon good fortune; the minor
himself is helpless, particularly when
under ten years of age.
The minor
possesses a right guaranteed by the
constitution, but cannot assert it
unless someone else, over whom he has no
control, learns about it, understands
it, is aware of the need to take prompt
action, and in fact takes such action.
We recognize, also, that some children
are without parents or have parents who
do
not
fulfill
commonly
accepted
parental functions. The statute makes
no exception for children who have
unconcerned parents, children in foster
care, or those in institutions; . . .
9

ten, the

As to parents themselves, some are lazy
or frightened or ignorant or religiously
opposed to legal redress. Still, they
have their remedy available to them if
they choose to use it* The child does
not.
Barrio v. San Manuel Division
Hospital for Magna Copper Co., 692 P.2d
280, 2985-296 (Ariz* 1984).
The Utah Supreme Court's analysis of the argument
that the minor can be represented by a guardian is similar.
Ruling that the general tolling provisions for minority had
to be applied to the Governmental Immunity Act's Notice of
Claims provision, the Court stated:
The parents or natural guardians have no
specific legal duty to perform and have
no
responsibility
to
their
minor
offspring
other
than
their
moral
obligation. Consequently, in matters of
this kind, when a parent, natural
guardian fails, for one reason or
another to give notice, file suit, or
otherwise protect the minor's legal
interests, the minor is left completely
without a remedy.
Scott v. School Board of Granite
School District, 568 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah
1977) .
This Court then stated that any ruling prohibiting
the general tolling provisions for minority from applying to
the notice of claim requirement would work "a denial of due
process and equal protection."

Ixi. at 568.

Since Article

I, Section 11, has been interpreted as giving a degree of
substantive due process protection, presumably, this is one
of the provisions that the court had in mind.
In any event, Berry v. Beach Aircraft, supra which
invalidated our products liability statute of repose held
that Article

I, Section

11

limits

legislative

power

to

ill, Li I,,1!!, t . J ! I I \ "

action.

'ijlilf, I. d I I,

U!H-iJ

"„

I iqlll

I

I • 1 I 11^

d

[ Hj f" S U I I ei I

Berry and Sax v. Votteler, supra, shows that the

anti-tolling requirement and the imposition
of

I 11 | U f " /

repose

in

Section

' 78 ] 4 !

?

*

- statute
I «it tj

lui in<| mi

Article 1, Section 1 ] of Utah 1 s Constitution.

Ill
AS APPLIED TO MINORS,
SECTION 78-14-4 DOES NOT SATISFY
UTAH'S RATIONAL BASIS EQUAL PROTECTION TEST
Malai i y

Lewis „

"• i 1 11 111 I I ill . i 11 1r* 8 4 I < ie t i n e d

Utah f s equal protection rational basis
that

classifications
• ,'. i "

must

reasonably

' h |».'i !• i \ ' i '

that classifications under

*-

Malan

promote
-

u. .

test.

held

legitimate

Malan

^ n l ^u ^

subject

Tor the purposes of this case, the Court need not decide
whether
the statute
of repose
in
its entirety
is
unconstitutional. The Court need only decide whether its bar
can be applied during a victim's minority. But the four year
medical malpractice statute is more discriminatory than the six
year products liability statute. About 10% of the potential
medical malpractice claims are not even discovered by the end
of
that
period.
Jenkins, California's
Medical
Injury
Compensation Reform Act on Equal Protection Analysis, 52 So.
Cal. L.Rev. 829, 960-961 (1979). It then takes time to decide
to go to an attorney. Because medical malpractice claims are
fiercely resisted and costly to prosecute, it takes even more
time for an attorney to decide to bring such an action.
Unlike most products liability claims, medical
malpractice claims inherently require some discovery period,
especially to discover the "legal injury," Like some products,
some forms of medical malpractice will take time before even
the physical injury manifests itself. The shorter four years
statute
ii s then
imposed upon
a shortened
statute of
limitations, a bewildering array of procedural necessities and
substantive changes to the common law.

degree of judicial scrutiny.

That case expressly stated

that it is unconstitutional to single out a group "on the
basis of a tenuous
merit."

(JLd.

at

between

children

justification
671.)

Section

injured

by

that has

little or no

78-14-4

discriminates

health

care

children injured by all other tort-feasors.
discussed,

the

relationship

between

the

providers

and

As has been
Act's

alleged

purposes and this discrimination is "tenuous" and of "little
or no merit."
The Utah Supreme Court has already demonstrated
its belief that the "stale claim" argument should not stand
in the way of justice.

Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P. 2d 244

(Utah 1980); Szaval v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1981);
Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981).
Ma Ian rejected

Significantly,

a fraudulent claims argument applying the

equal protection rational basis test.

Malan v. Lewis, 693

P.2d 661, 674 (Utah 1984).

The legislation also discriminates between adults injured
by medical malpractice
and
children who
have medical
malpractice claims. The discrimination is subtle but real.
Under the statute, adults are given a period of time to
"discover" their legal injury for themselves and to take
appropriate action.
In reality, children cannot "discover" their injury
because they cannot comprehend it. If they are young enough
and no one takes action for them, they have no discovery
period.
The act also provides exceptions to the two-year
statute of limitations and the four-year statute of repose when
there is a foreign body and when there is concealment. The
failure to give minors a similar exception itself violates
equal protection. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P. 2d 661, 673 (Utah
1984).

w i i in i f'spfn I i
restrictions
Section

on

minors

7R-14-0

i:,iii

HI in

to

MI i ieyec.1 ineea u » i m p o s e

reduce

n J ,' be

premiums,

de m i n i m u s .

the

severe

effect

Any

such

of

effect

won I <il I it" at tset In a degree b;y w e l f a r e , and is merely c u m u lative

mi in

light

ot

a] 3

the

other

legislation that has been enacted

medical

malpractice

The need to d i sci: i in :i nate

against m i n o r s is therefore of " 1 :i ttl e ::: i: no m e r i t " and does
not satisfy M a l a n 1 s rational basi s test.
that

- \ t:

arbi' r .v

<.\ i oi is

Malan1s

directive

i i :: I: t =

premiums hammers that point h o m e .
Scott v. School Board of Granite School District,

discriminatory

treatment

protection clause

apply

the

Immunity
equal

notice

s imi lar ly he Id that
notice

q 11a. t: ant .ees \ ,
Hunter

, 1...0

v.

( Id
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i ia*

n-:
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equal
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wou] d

fa i lure to app 1/y

requirements

"work

*overnmental
a

denial

0 the .3 :

states

to 11 ing provi s ions

violates

equa ]

»

Eoe

6 ; 0 I 2< :! 582

Mason

High

School,

Tafoya

North

^iate-

provision-

provisions

pr> Dtect i on. "

s imilar

y.,n< .

\lthough * * J- ;:ase

genera ^ \
Act"s

oi

529

ha < e
to

protection

(N 1! 5

P. 2d

of

898

i! f |: • 1 983) ;
(] 9 74) ,

aff'd. 539 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1 9 7 5 ) . 6

Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A. 2d 87 (R.I. 1983) utilized the
rational basis test to find Rhode Island's entire Malpractice
Act u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , apparently on the grounds that the
alleged crisis w a s not significant.

IV
UNDER UTAH'S CONSTITUTION, THE RIGHT
TO BRING A PERSONAL INJURY ACTION IS A RIGHT
THAT IS ENTITLED TO HEIGHTENED EQUAL PROTECTION REVIEW
The
satutes

United

affecting

States

Supreme

rights

Court has held

"explicitly

or

that

implicitly

guaranteed by the Constitution" are tested under the strict
scrutiny

standard

for

equal

protection

purposes,

San

Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S,
1, 33-34 (1973).

To be sure, the right to bring a personal

injury action is not a fundamental right under the U.S.
Constitution.
State's

But, applying the same basic test under our

Constitution would

protection scrutiny.

result

in a heightened

equal

The right to bring a personal injury

claim is protected under Utah's Constitution.
Years ago, the Utah Supreme Court characterized
the right to bring a tort claim as a "substantial right."
Bracken v. Dahle, 251 P. 16 (Utah 1926).

The Court's recent

decision in Berry v. Beach Aircraft Corp., supra, confirms
the fact that common law tort rights are of Constitutional
dimensions in Utah.

The equal protection test when such

rights are affected should not be less stringent than the
test

applied

Constitution.

under

Article

I,

Section

11

of

Utah's

WlirH

' 1 h'l

"scrutiny" test
issue.

Under

i

something
ar-

'"'iii't scrutiny f-ps^-" »
1 n between is not a decisive

heightened

atdndaicl

disci xiiiLi'idting efiec*. which Section

"|

review,

the

7 l-l 14-4 lias ...n minors

cannot stand.
Using

an

intermediat

Supreme Court in Carson v. Maurer, * invalidated

- . .

the

part

,.,.*. .oris

Although
•'
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*N

i 980)

a m e n - i' n-alpract * a

ior m i n o r -

malpractice claims.

right

ol

~\r-*

*

a

*•

.•:

:, -. a p p l y

-

*•.

wr : "h

medical

t declare *n^ right
. -

- |'M ,

1

. * ^.-u: • : characterized such a r:i ght as an "important

substantive

right™

which

is

"sufficiently

important

I

o
e

subjected to a more rigorous j u d i c a l scrutiny than allowed

7

Under the United States Constitution, the
"strict
scrutiny test" requires that the classification be necessary to
promote a compelling that interest Plyler y. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
217 (1982) . The middle level or "scrutiny" test is whether the
classification
is substantially
related to a
legitimate
government interest. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (] 9 7 1 ) .
8
The Utah Supreme Court has not decided whether children
are a "discreet and insular" minority justifying treatment
under some form of heightened scrutiny. In illegitimacy cases,
the United States Supreme Court has given middle level scrutiny
to legislation affecting minors. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S.
91 (1982). The combination of minority plus the importance of
education triggered the middle-level "scrutiny" test in Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Such cases indicate that the U.S.
Supreme Court is really applying a sliding scale analysis to
equal protection challenges though a majority has yet to admit
as much. If that right to bring a personal injury action by
(Footnote Continued)

under the rational basis teste"

(Icl. at 830.)

In deter-

mining the constitutionality of New Hampshire's Malpractice
Act, the court applied the following test:
Whether the malpractice statute can be
justified as a reasonable measure in
furtherance of the public
interest
depends upon whether the restriction of
private rights sought to be imposed is
not so serious that it outweighs the
benefits sought to be conferred upon the
general public.
U d . at 831.)
Holding that elimination of the tolling provisions
for a minor's medical malpractice claims did not satisfy
that test, the court found that the discrimination did not
substantially further the legislative objective because of
the

small number of claims that would be affected.

It

further held that the non-tolling provision unfairly burdened medical malpractice claimants.

(IcL. at 834.)

Idaho used an intermediate "means-focusff test in
Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399 (Id. 1976) to
determine the constitutionality of Idaho's medical malpractice legislation.
findings,

the

means-focus

Before remanding the case for factual

Supreme

test

should

Court

held

be

applied

that

the

intermediate

for equal

protection

analysis.

On remand, the District Court held, the special

statute

of

limitations

applicable

to

minors

(Footnote Continued)
itself is not enough to trigger a higher standard of equa]
protection review, the combination fo the right plus minority
should under our State Constitution.

I inconst i tuti : i ia ]

Jones

55527 & 55586 (4th Di 31 :
1n

the

Arneson

Nor tl i Dakota

v, state

Board of Medicine , Nos.

Idaho 1980).

> . Olson , 270 N. W 2d ] 25

Supreme

entire malpractice act ,

Cour t str uck

down

(N. I)
that

] 97 8) ,
state '" s

The cour t i n Arneson utilized

the

intermediate test for equal protection analysis.
For the reasons

stated

in the discussion on, the

Malan rational basis test r the discriminatory

effect wh i ch

Section 78 • 14-4 has on minors won I < I in I v/1 t hst'.uul a IT; - ] evel
of heightened scrutiny.

CONCLUSION
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the

Medical
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- •

IIMJI'I

1111 f i i u i

HI

e

Those provisions ^ .o -ite r^t* 'oen *.ou: r s

declaration of the Utah Constitution a, it the
li i

Malpractice

iiii' I

11.1 i i r i in i ii<) I ii i ; ,

orst - tutir.n * s

l i ' . g i s l a t j o i :i

•

iiout

n e e d anil in s p i t e oi less d r a s t i c alten: latives, this special
legislation
fai rness

violates

important

guarantees

of

fundamental

Till: .€ E :i s ti :

The case should be remanded
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APPENDIX

APPENDIX
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The
Annotated,

relevant

part

of

section

7 8-14-4,

(J 953 as amended) reads as f^llows:
malpractice
action
against a
health care provider may be brought
unless it is commenced within two
years
after
the
plaintiff
or
patient discovers, or through the
use of reasonable diligence should
have discovered the injury, whichever
first
occurs, but
not
to
exceed four years after the date of
the alleged act, omission, neglect
or occurrence, except that:
(a) In an action where the allegata on
against
the
health
care
provider is that a foreign object
has been wrongfully left within a
patient's body, the claim shall be
barred unless commenced within one
year after the plaintiff or patient
discovers, or through the use of
reasonable
diligence
should
have
discovered, the existence of the
foreign object wrongfully left in
the patient's body, whichever first
occurs; and,
(b) In
an
action
where
it
is
alleged that a patient has been
prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care
provider because that health care
provider has affirmatively acted to
fraudulent! y conceal
tt le all leged
misconduct,
the
claim
shall
be
barred unless commenced within one
year after the plaintiff or patient
discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence, should have
discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs.

Utah

<1 ode

(2)

The provisions of this
section
shall
apply
to
all
persons,
regardless of minority or other
legal
disabilit y
in 1 d e r
Se c t io n
78-12-36 or any o t h e r p r o v i s i o n of
the l a w , and shall apply r e t r o a c tively t .c a] 1 persons, partnerships, associations and corporations
and
to all health
care
providers and to all malpractice
actions against health care providers based upon alleged personal
injuries which occurred prior to
the effective date of this act;
provided, however, that any action
which under former law could have
been commenced after the effective
date of this act may be commenced
only within the unelapsed portion
of time al lowed under former law;
but any action which under former
law could have been commenced more
than four years after the effective
date of this act may be commenced
only within four years after the
effective date of this act.
SELECTED RELEVANT
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Article

I, Section

""

f t* e Utah

Consti tution

reads as follows:
All courts shall be open, and every
person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall
be barred from prosecuting or defending
before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel , any civil cause to
which he i s a party.
Article

I, Section

24 of

tl le Utah

Constitution

reads as f ::: ,1 ] • :: ws :
All laws of a general nature shal 1
hav e i n li form, operations .

Section
Constitution

of

1
the

of

the

United

Fourteenth

Amendment

States

Airier i ca

of

follows:
A 1 1 pe r s o n s b o rn o r natu r a 1 i z e d i i I
the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.
No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life,
liberty,
or
property,
without
due
process of ] aw; nor deny to any person
within
its
jurisdiction
the
equal
protection of the laws.

